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ESOTERIC ANTHROPOLOGY: 
"DEVOLUTIONARY" AND "EVOLUTIONARY" 
ORIENTATIONS IN PERENNIAL PHILOSOPHY 
Sheldon R. Isenberg and Gene R. Thursby 
Introduction 
Humanity as a whole has never been in so precarious a position. 
We live under daily threat from pollution, polarization, and potential 
global destruction. Ours is a time of extraordinary crisis. But few 
notice one of the deepest roots of this crisis. It js not just that 
"we" do not understand "them", it is also that we do not understand 
ourselves. There· is a crisis of understanding underlying the very 
points of view which we designate as 1'modern", for inherent to 
late modern thought is a radical skepticism about the possibility 
of understanding anything or anyone. 
The modem world is a stage in a process in which humanity 
has, at least on the surface, eliminated the myths and metaphysics 
of traditional culture, and since the eighteenth century the release 
from the past has been made palpable in a devotion to autonomous 
reason and technical progress. But the unprecedented brutality 
of war and the unforeseen consequences of an unbridled technology 
have called into question the human hope to create a heaven on 
earth. So we find in recent patterns of thought a questioning of 
the optjmism and the simplistic anthropologies which were 
characteristic of the early modern period. ln the current stage 
of modernity we find a despair accompanying the belief that we 
cannot really understand what it is we might find worth saving 
from this crisis - for thoroughgoing moderns there can be no clear 
notion about what it would mean to "save" humanity. 
One consequence of this modern spiritual dead-end is a reaction 
which has taken the form of a nourishing anti-intellectualism 
manifested in superstitious techniques to ward off fears, in nruve 
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fundamentalism, and in authoritarian cults. Another consequence 
is increased interest in non-Western spiritual movements which, 
whatever their own effectiveness, typically have not yet come 
to terms with modernity. So neither the advocates of reactionary 
nativism nor those who endorse imported traditionalism have been 
able to offer the means of integration necessary to take us beyond 
the contradictions that threaten to destroy us. 
However, there is a different standpoint, calling itself a 
"perennial philosophy", which claims to transcend the paradigm 
of modernity by comprehension rather than merely to oppose it. 
This claim must seem paradoxical or nonsensical, or course, in 
the context of the modem commitment to dialectic and the modern 
denial of transcendence. It inevitably provokes puzzlement in 
moderns- a consequence of an image of human nature and possibility 
which is characteristic of modernity, and which perennial philosophy 
sees as constricted and incomplete. 
The purpose of this paper is to delineate over and against 
some modern images the main features of a perennial anthropology 
- the human image which is an aspect of the comprehensive 
paradigm entailed by "perennial philosophy" - in order to provide 
a basis from which to begin an intelligent consideration of the 
claim that the transcendent perspective of perennial philosophy 
offers a significant critique of modernity and vital guidance for 
moving beyond it. We believe that this "perennial" perspective 
offers a valuable critical tool for assessing our current situation 
- one that comprehends and transcends the despair of relativism, 
on the one hand, while preserving respect for esoteric orthodoxies 
and promising a freedom beyond their psychic bonds, on the other. 
The perspective we will consider has been presented in Europe 
most notably in the writings of Rene Guenon, Frithjof Schuon, 
and their associates; and in the United States by Huston Smith 
and more recently by Seyyed Hossein Nasr. In addition to these 
writers, and others who consider Guenon or Schuon their teachers, 
there are others who claim connection to the perennial philosophy, 
and who represent what we might term different recensions. Yet 
all of them seek to articulate a standpoint which finds its basis 
in unitive mysticism, and so they affirm a convergence of 
perspectives among those who follow any authentic path of mystical 
ascent to a certain level of experience. These contemporary 
philosophers seek to draw from a common core of knowledge which 
is the foundation of all of the great religious traditions. Their writing, 
therefore, is not so much characterized by a devotion to novelty 
as by repeated references to a large but· nevertheless delimited 
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set of traditional teachers, including Neo-Platonists, Hermetics, 
Advaita Hindus, Mahayana Buddhists, Sufi Muslims, and Christian 
and Jewish mystics. 
Our procedure will be to begin the treatment of our topic 
by making some general observations about modernity as a distinctive 
perspective or paradigm. We will indicate some of its general 
features and focus on the human image integral to it. We shall 
then shift to the human image associated with the perennial 
anthropology, which is shared by two "recensions" of perennial 
philosophy - the first of which is identified with those who 
acknowledge the influence of Guenon and Schuon. Secondly, we 
shall distinguish between the recensions by noting the differences 
in their approaches to modernity, and will conclude with a brief 
discussion of what differences those differences make. 
Perspectives and Anthropologies 
Human art, myths, and philosophies are obvious testimonies 
to the simple truth that we humans have always been fascinated 
(if not obsessed) by questions about ourselves. Our myths narrate 
the stories of how and why we got here, while our philosophies 
define and analyze what makes us human. Contemporary 
metaphysician Oscar Ichazo connects the overall process of human 
thought to our long quest to find out who we are: 
Man has defined himself as 'Homo sapiens', the man 
who thinks. Throughout all history, the question of reason, 
or how human beings think, has been permanently posed 
before our eyes. If there is a difference between us 
human beings and all that is not human in nature, it 
is this: We are the only creatures who question their 
own identity.! 
Three patterns which are typical in intelligent reflection 
on human nature, and which may be used as headings under which 
most approaches to philosophical discussion of human identity may 
be grouped, are (philosophical) sociology, anthropology, and 
cosmology. Ethicist Alisdair Macintyre asserts that moral philosophy 
"characteristically presupposes a sociology".2 Endorsing Macintyre's 
observation, we expand it by noting that models of human nature 
and of society, in general, tend to be transforms of one another 
and tend to imply matching cosmologies.3 Therefore, study of a 
particular philosophical anthropology will anticipate much of what 
we would find in the same case in the other two aspects of the 
image or paradigm. Humans are embedded in societies, both of 
which are embedded in a cosmos. 
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Our strategy in this paper will be to examine the human images 
revealed by and underlying the perspectives of modernity and of 
perennial philosophy. Although any underlying image has crucial 
implications, the image itself tends to be tacit. Our perceptions 
arise from points of view. We see ourselves, each other, and other 
things within a given (and/or achieved) perspective; a human image 
underlies every human perspective. The task, then, is to discern 
at the root of the perspective characteristic of modernity the beliefs 
about human nature, society, and the cosmos from which humanity 
exists. 
The pattem of human identity conferred by the operating 
human image, and certainly the lived or vital sense of humanity 
correlated with it, constitutes the most fundamental paradigm 
for thought about and life in a society - the set of beliefs and 
assumptions which establish the parameters within which 
relationships are realized and enacted. Ordinarily we relate to 
each other on the basis of who we believe we and they now are 
and can become. We attribute knowledge to ourselves and to others 
within the limits of what we believe is known and knowable. The 
perennialist critique of modernity can be summarized in the assertion 
that the typically modem human image is truncated and thereby 
dangerously distorted. 
The Human Image in Modemity 
There is no lack of contemporary sensitivity to the poverty 
of the modem human image. For example, neo-Freudian Marxist 
philosopher Herbert Marcuse has laid bare the damage that modern 
socio-economic structures inflict in their reduction of humanity 
to a "one dimensional man", and psychologist Floyd Matson has 
evoked the plight of modern man in terms of a "broken image". 
But it is not our intention to review and categorize these variations 
on the typically modern description of human nature. Instead we 
shall focus on what perennialists consider to be two quintessentially 
modern movements, both of them connected to the rise and total 
pervasiveness of scientific method and its attendant technology. 
The is positivism, and the second hermeneutics. Positivism, 
rooted in the paradigm of seventeenth - through early twentieth 
century science, has its wider expression in scientism. Hermeneutics, 
rooted in a rejection of the metaphysics implicit in positivism, 
receives expression in historicism. From a perennialist perspective, 
however, both are reductionist. 
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Positivism, Scientism, and Materialism: 
Humanity as One-Dimensional 
Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is an 
incisive account of the historical development of positivism, the 
philosophical position founded on total confidence in the physi cal 
sciences as our pipeline to reality. 4 The metaphor which captures 
its underlying anthropology is that of "mind as mirror", which 
contains the notion that our knowledge is a function of our ability 
to represent physical reality in our minds: "Without the notion 
of mind as mirror, the notion of knowledge as accuracy of 
representation would not have suggested itself".5 Underlying this 
metaphor is a cosmology that includes only one level, that of physical 
realit y. Thus all search for truth, for knowldge, is about our 
impressions · of and pictures of that part of reality available to 
us through our senses or the extensions of our senses which we 
construct through our technology. The meanings of our sentences 
depend on our capacity to "verify" - to specify behavioural protocols 
which will yield sense impressions to confirm or deny tbe accuracy 
of the representations expressed by the words. 
Rorty, however, is also concerned with the next stage required 
by any representationalist philosophy, the necessity to specify 
the proper functioning of our representational machinery, our minds. 
The modern philosophers in the analytic movement, hard on the 
heels of positivism, devoted themselves to considering just how 
we can best clarify and evaluate our perceptions and how we can 
most unequivocally communicate them. They installed epistemology 
as the monitor, the super-critic, of all science just as the positivists 
established science as the model for all knowledge. The result, 
of course, was scientism, which Joseph Bleicher defines in this 
way: 
Scientism, as I use the term, would entail a commitment 
to one or more of the following tenets: science deals 
with 'facts' given independently of the researcher; the 
empiric-analytic method is the only valid mode of 
knowledge-acquisition; that this method should be 
extended to all spheres of cognitive activity; that its 
results are the only true form of knowledge.6 
Consonant with positivism and scientism, then, is materialism 
as a metaphysical position. The anthropology of materialism asserts 
that all existents, including humanity, are matter. The very minds 
making such assertions are either epiphenomenal or should not 
be spoken of as "existing" at all: 
182 
Materialism is the name given to a family of doctrines 
concerning the nature of the world which give to matter 
a primary position and accord to mind (or spirit) a 
secondary, dependent reality or even none at all. Extreme 
materialism asserts that the real world consists of 
ma terial things, varying in their states and relations, 
and not hing else. 7 
A particular form of materialism called "physicalism" espoused 
by Paul Feyerabend, Hilary Putnam, and Herbert Feigl defines 
what we experience as variations of interior awareness as "in fact" 
neither more not less than states of the nervous system. With the 
adoption of physicalism, the reduction of humanity to one dimension, 
one level of reality, is completed: to be human is to be a body living 
for a limited time in a universe of bodies and space. 
Materialism as a modern cosmology corresponds to a belief 
that what we can know is limited to the patterns established by 
the material sciences. As limiting as some have found such a model, 
it is nevertheless consistent with the affirmation that we can know, 
we can understand; that we can describe the world, and, with 
appropriate methodology we can describe ourselves. 
Self-understanding under this paradigm corresponds, of course, 
to behaviourism, the doctrine that we are what we do, with "doing" 
taken as physical action, verbal action - whatever is available 
to any readily trained observer. The identity question here is never 
"Who am I" but rather "What are the behaviour patterns observed, 
and how do they change when variables (which are likely to be 
physico-chemical factors) are manipulated". Nevertheless, even 
within this limitation of identity to observable behaviours, the 
belief is that we can know what is actually there to be known, 
and that what cannot be caught in this particular net simply isn't 
there to be caught. No ghosts inhabit this machine, but we can 
describe the elements and assembly of the machinery. 
Hermeneutics, Relativism, and the Rejection of Positivism 
Perennialists tend to accept most features of the critiques 
of positivism offered by pragmatism, existentialism, and 
hermeneutics. But in their rejections of positivism, these other 
philosophical orientations reveal aspects of their positions including 
their implicit, as well as explicit, anthropologies, which differ 
significantly from the perennialist estimate of humanity. 
Neo-pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty once again provides 
an admirable epitome of this expression of modernity. His rejection 
of positivism does not constitute a rejection of materialism: 
Religious Traditions 
Every speech, thought, theory, poem, composition, 
and philosophy will turn out to be completely predictable 
in purely naturalistic terms. Some atoms-and-the-void 
account of micro-processes within individual human 
beings will permit the prediction of every sound or 
inscription which will ever be uttered. There are no 
ghosts. a 
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Yet Rorty has strong interests in promoting conversation, 
and so for him the materialist, even physicalist, assumptions do 
not get the interpretive weight which others are likely to accord 
them. Although he believes it possible to specify the neural causal 
network of our thoughts, emotions, and dreams, that does not 
complete the material reduction of human thought: 
The secret in the poet's heart remains unknown to the 
secret police, despite their a bill ty to predict his every 
thought, utterance, and movement by monitoring his 
cerebroscope which he must wear day and night. We 
can know which thoughts pass through a man 's mind 
without understanding them. !i 
Predicting is one kind of behaviour we can manifest; 
understanding is another type of behaviour. But understanding also 
systematically surpasses measuring and predicting- we can measure 
and predict without understanding; we can come to understand 
the unpredictable. This distinction, exemplified by Rorty, amounts 
to a rejection of a positivist-analytic perspective that restricts 
"meaningful" statements to those which have a behaviourally or 
materially verifiable referent, when "verifiable" is taken in a 
modern, scientific causal sense which also entails (predictive power 
or) predictability. 
Obviously Rorty intends to reject all forms of philosophical 
idealism. In fact, he writes in the hope that we will come to see 
the "mind-body" problem as a confusion (rather than a problem) 
arising from bad philosophical technique which perpetrated a 
misleading reification of straightforward human behavioural 
processes - thinking, dreaming, understanding, etc. In fact, he would 
have everyone get out of the business of playing with such categories 
as "ontology", "realities", "consciousness", "mental"- and "material", 
so long as we mean by 'material' "that which is non-mental". For 
Rorty argues that such categorizations rely on the baseless belief 
that we can meaningfully make such distinctions. Instead, such 
categorizations are no more than habits we exhibit in conversa.tions 
about our experiences. 
Rorty rejects positivism and the positivistic version of the 
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analytic position on language not so much because of a concern 
about reductionism, but for two other reasons. First and crucial, 
he rejects the overarching belief of positivism that sentences can 
represent things "as they are", so that we could then evaluate 
expressions in relation to experiences of "things as they are" 
uncontaminated by the very language we are trying to evaluate. 
That is, Rorty claims that the descriptions of phenomena by 
scientists, and the evaluation of those descriptions by epistemologists 
who claim to have some special knowledge about how people -
especially scientists - know, are just another kind of description, 
and not {oWldational to any other. To illustrate his point: when 
Gertrude Stein says, "A rose is a rose is a rose. . . , " that assertion 
is not translatable to a chemist's report that chemical analysis 
of petals from two separate roses reveals identical chemical 
components. The language of poetry and the language of chemistry 
are two different ways of speaking and are likely to belong in two 
different conversations. Neither is foundational to the other neither 
can be determined to be ontologically superior; nor does it make 
sense to claim in general that one is epistemologically superior 
in the sense that one "really" describes the rose, and the other 
is "merely" a metaphorical statement about the "real" rose, or 
in the sense that the "chemical analysis" inevitably misses the 
"essence" of the rose. So, if we take physics to be the paradigmatic 
science of positivism and then look at the comments of atomic 
and sub-atomic physicists on their own enterprise, we are struck 
by the clarity with which the scientists themselves recognize the 
indirection of their experimentation, the lack of direct, uninterpreted 
experience of what is under study. Sir Arthur Eddington puts it 
most effectively, when he observes, "The physical atom is, like 
everything else in physics, a schedule of pointer readings".lO 
Rorty's conclusion is that all human "knowledge" is 
interpretation, and none of it can be foundational. His rejection 
of positivism is entailed by his rejection of the "correspondence 
theory" of language: 
We have to drop the notion of correspondence for 
sentences as well as for thoughts, and see sentences 
as connected with other sentences rather than with 
the world. We have to see the term 'corresponds to 
how things are' as an automatic compliment paid to 
successful normal discourse rather than as a re.lation 
to be studied and aspired to ••. .11 
In short, knowledge is a language affair, and language is at root 
a social activity. Rorty in this way shifts into the characteristic 
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stance of hermeneutics. We and our world are largely created 
and dominated by languages. As human selves, we are constituted 
by our languages and by the conversations in which we are 
participants. Languages are human achievements, and in turn we 
conceive our experiences through their grids. Insofar as we describe 
we create (rather than correctly or falsely represent); insofar as 
we offer descriptions of ourselves, we imagine and invent ourselves. 
On this theme Rorty approvingly quotes Peirce: 
Man makes the word, and the word means nothing which 
the man has not made it mean, and that only to some 
other man. But . . . man can think only by means of 
words or other external symbols. . • . [T]he word or 
sign which man uses is the man himself. . . . [T]hus 
my language is the sum total of myself; for the man 
is the thought.l2 
Rorty's formulation ties together the seemingly diverse strands 
of modern thought in American pragmatism, European existentialism, 
and post-structuralist hermeneutics. His success in disposing of 
the specifically positivist use of "scientific method" as foundational 
for all other knowledge-claims and indeed of the general notion 
that due to privileged sensorial access any type of knowledge-claim 
can be foundational to any other, leaves him holding the position 
that all knowledge is irreducibly interpretive. Further all 
interpretation is relative to a given community of interpreters, 
and so all knowledge-claims are integral to the activity of on-going 
conversation with a community of interpreters - all of whom share 
(perhaps tacitly) certain unprovable premises. 
The result is that we must come to view all "facts" as products 
of a pre-existing perspective, hence as "theory-laden"; i.e., our 
very portioning-out of experience to designate this or that a "fact" 
is already an interpretive, a hermeneutical enterprise. Truth and 
knowledge, in this perspective, are not attributes of "factual" 
statements, but are categories produced by and utilized within 
a locus of conversants - which is and can only be within particular 
realms of human intersubjectivity. Therefore, this interpretive 
framework implicitly detaches the human appetite for knowledge 
and meaning from the grossly material realm, from body, and 
attaches it (without acknowledging the fact) to the mental realm, 
to symbol-making and linguistic interchange. As Nelson Goodman 
says, no longer can we delude ourselves with the belief that we 
find our worlds- we make them.13 
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The Limits of Intersubjectivity: Reality as Conversations 
This modern philosophical anthropology conceives of us as 
living in a one-storeyed building filled with an indeterminate numbers 
of rooms shared by like-minded interpreters. 'Reality' means 
consensus among conversants; it is a probably local and always 
phenomenal reality, cooked-up according to the prevailing tastes. 
If the man is the thought, as Peirce said, then, as Sartre averred 
(although from the perspective that "the man is the consciously 
chosen action") there is nothing essentially human. We are who 
we think we are. Humanity is, and can be known, only as constantly 
in flux. Rorty's imagery captures the spirit of this perspective: 
••• there is nothing deep down inside us except what 
we have put there ourselves, no criterion that we have 
not created in the course of creating a practice, no 
standard of rationality that · is not an appeal to such 
a criterion, no rigorous argumentation that is not 
obedience to such conventions. r4 
And as for the sociological consequence of a community of persons 
believing in (and from) such an anthropology: "A post-Philosophical 
culture, then, would be one in which men and women felt themselves 
alone, merely finite, with no links to something Beyond".15 In such 
a vision which locates the sources of meaning, truth, and value 
in social consensus, culture must be viewed as a great game, a 
common delusion, which most (but not all) people play while believing 
that it is real. 
Similar visions come out of psychoanalysis. Ernest Becker 
in his later works, especially The Denial of Death,l6 makes an 
extraordinarily powerful analysis which links our attachment to 
our cultural hero systems, i.e., our consensus realities, to our effort 
to mask the fear of dying experienced by our threatened egos. 
He describes the dynamics of those gross obsessional neuroses which 
he believes constitute the totality of our character structures and 
cultures. In fact, his accounts sound remarkably like Hindu 
descriptions of maya or Buddhist descriptions of duhkha. But there 
are differences. For now, we can note the major difference that 
Becker's cosmology is materialist, with our inner processes perceived 
as anomalous in the universe. Since we are unable to cope with 
the material realities most powerfully symbolized by death, mind 
is and must be disconnected from the truths of physical existence 
and can do no more than to reflect itself in an endless hall of mirrors. 
So the recognition of the inability of mind and reason to 
represent what we experience leads to images of despair - when 
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that recognition comes from a perspective that assumes that there 
is only body left when mind is subtracted or abstracted. Sartrean 
nausea combines with psychoanalytic reality-testing in this dramatic 
cosmology offered by Becker: 
Creation is a nightmare spectacular taking place on 
a planet that has been soaked for hundreds of millions 
of years in the blood of all its cratures. The soberest 
conclusion that we could make about what has been 
actually taking place on the planet for about three 
billion years is that it is being turned into a vast pit 
of fertilizer. But the sun distracts our attention, always 
baking the blood dry, making things grow over it •.•. 
(W ]hatever man does on this planet has to be done with 
the lived truth of the terror of creation, of the grotesque, 
of the rumble of panic underneath everything. Otherwise 
it is false. Whatever is achieved must be achieved from 
within the subjective energies of creatures.l7 
The recognition of the ultimate impotence of the human 
mind in the face of the vast, impersonally brutal physicality of 
existence is enough to elicit Becker's agreement with Otto Rank's 
"option for the irrational as the basis of life; it is an option based 
on empirical experience". All that we have left, then, are illusions, 
new heroisms, new immortality projects "grounded in healthy 
repressions", i.e., functional but self-deluding lies. The terror of 
this si tuation "can only be gone beyond with the creation of new 
heroisms that are basically matters of belief and will. .•. rrl8 
All these images which deny the adequation of mind to 
experience, or deny mind altogether, lead to such relativisms. Once 
modern philosophers narrow truth-claims to knowledge within the 
material realm, and then proceed to take even the security blanket 
of that knowledge away at the limits of scientism - as well as 
at the limits of our ability to perceive the physical - we are left 
with nothing but our suffering subjectivities. For while they have 
rejected the model of physical science as foundational for knowing, 
they have retained its materialist cosmologies and thus maintain 
their physicalist anthropologies. What we find many modern 
philosophies share is their materialism, and where they differ is 
about whether or not we can know anything directly about the 
material world. The obvious analogy is the situation in theoretical 
physics when Einsteinian relativism began to replace the security 
of the Newtonian worldview, then was further qualified by the 
indeterminacy and indescribability of the new particle physics. 
It seems to the modern that the closer we look for the "building 
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blocks" of knowledge, the less we are able to say that we can really 
know. The more we look out at the world, the more we are forced 
to look in and ask about who it is that wants to know. And yet, 
from the hermeneutical perspective, when we look inside, we are 
still tied to the historically generated criteria of our communities 
to interpret the result s. What we see inside can only be a reflex 
of what we have been taught to perceive from the outside. Alisdair 
Macintyre declares that in ethics emotivism, the doctrine that 
moral claims have no principal referents but are ultimately dependent 
on our personal choices of values, is the quintessentially modern 
view and part of the belief-structures of moralists and social 
philosophers as diverse as Nietzsche, Sartre, Max Weber, and Erving 
Goffman. · 
Put in terms of our concern about anthropology, the assumption 
is that human points of view and value choices precede human 
judgments on particular issues. One does not make judgm ents by 
seeing a situation and applying independently existing moral 
principles, but rather we see the situation through the screen of 
our condit ioned value systems. Moral discourse, then, is reduced 
from discussion of value to competition by already determined 
wills which are seeking to convince and control each other: 
[E]valuative utterance can in the end have no point 
or use but the expression of my own feelings and attitudes 
to others (hence "emotivism"). I cannot genuinely appeal 
to impersonal criteria, for there are no impersonal 
criteria. • . . The sole reality of distinctively moral 
discourse is the attempt of one will to align the attitudes, 
feelings, preferences and choices of another with its 
own. Others are always means, never ends.l9 
The point is that while Macintyre may disagree with Rorty 
on important issues, and while both would disagree with Becker's 
neo-Freudian rhetoric, nonetheless they share a common 
anthropological paradigm. Consider Macintyre's description of 
the modern self: 
. . . [T]he emotivist self can have no rational history 
in its transitions from one state of moral commitment 
to another. Inner conflicts are for it necessarily au 
fond the confrontation of one contingent artibrariness 
by another. It is a self with no given continuities, save 
those of the body which is its bearer and of the memory 
which to the best of its ability gathers in its past ... . 
The self thus conceived, utterly distinct on the one 
hand from its social embodiments and lacking on the 
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other any rational history of its own, may seem to have 
a certain abstract and ghostly character.20 · 
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So we see displayed before us the consequences of the 
individualization and the fragmentation of human identity. One 
result is of particular interest. Macintyre argues that emotivism 
as a moral theory goes hand in glove with a pervasive utilitarianism, 
a kind of utilitarianism which Kant saw as particularly pernicious, 
but which has nonetheless held the day. When all values and 
symbology are taken as human creations, anomalous in the universe 
and ultimately fiction - what Becker calls self-delusions - then 
there can be no telos transcending humanity-as-it-is. All purposes 
after all, are merely further fi ctional enterprises. Macintyre joins 
others in pointing out that pre-modern cultures provided a coherent 
story in which individuals were embedded psychically. One of the 
features of living within such mythic structures was that life was 
given meaning, one was part of the cosmic drama, whether playing 
a bit part or a leading role. Personal thoughts and actions, then, 
transcended individual lives. And that is the point: there was the 
possibility of transcendence, of giving a gift beyond. 
But the transcendence available in traditional cultures was 
not merely the gift or sacrifice of the individual for the community 
of individuals. Transcendence was also a matter of ontological 
and epistemological levels. One of the results of the belief in a 
materialist cosmology is that ultimately all existents occupy one 
ontic level. In traditional cultures, on the other hand, reality was 
experienced as multi-leveled. Humans experienced themselves 
as multi-leveled, and their communities spanned at least from 
earth to heaven, so to speak. So transcendence was not a quantitative 
matter of one giving to many - not a transcendence provided by 
"patriotism" in a nationalistic context - it involved transformation, 
the realization of higher levels of being by the individual and/or 
the community. We shall return to this point shortly. We raise it 
now to note that, because of the modern unileveled ontology, ideals 
of transcendence expressed by Kant's dictum not to treat others 
as means but only as ends, fail to convince. When society is conceived 
atomistically, utilitarianism rules. Ends are gained by the atoms 
of society competing to accumulate whatever quantity is possible. 
There are no qualitative yardsticks to measure achievement, and 
the result is the quantification of transcendence. 
This brings us back to Richard Rorty and his vision of what 
modern philosophy ought to be. The image with which he wants 
to replace philosophy as "mirror of nature" is philosophy as 
conversation. If human beings have no essence, then one description 
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of them is no more "essential" than any other - and certainly 
that of the "philosopher" cannot claim precedence. There is no 
"knowledge" more essential than any other, closer to the reality 
of what being human is about, or for: 
If we see knowing not as having an essence, to be 
described by scientists or philosophers, but rather as 
a right, by current standards, to believe, then we are 
well on the way to seeing conversation as the ultimate 
context within which knowledge ls to be understood.21 
In the end there is no knowledge, there is only talking, only 
conversation. As "knowledge consultant", the philosopher still 
has a function but only within that social, ever changing milieu. 
There are criteria, there are rules in the games - language that 
is chaotic communicates little. But the rules keep changing, the 
games keep changing - and they all change as the players change 
across time. 
In this view, the chief error of positivism and scientism is 
the belief that there is or can be only one conversation that deals 
with what is "really there" to be talked about. Rorty says that 
there are many conversations that cannot be reduced to one. And 
each conversation is about the topics made up by agreement, implicit 
or explicit, of the conversants. There is no way to rank the 
conversations in terms of essentiality. What then should a 
philosopher do? Not search for eternal truths, for there are none, 
and anyway we could not agree ahead of time what one would look 
like if we met up with one; not even search for true sentences: 
In a post-Philosophical culture, some other hope would 
drive us to read through the libraries, and to add new 
volumes to the ones we found. Presumably, it would 
be the hope of offering our descendents a way of 
describing the ways of describing we had come across 
- a description of the ways which the race had come 
up with so far.22 
So the philosopher is general historian of conversations and 
practitioner of "the hermeneutic activity of making connections 
between our own culture and some exotic culture or historical 
period, or between our own discipline and another . . . [andJ in 
the 'poetic' activity of thinking • .. new aims, new words, or new 
disciplines. . . . n2J 
The philosopher's role, then, is to monitor existing 
conversations, interpret among conversations, create new ones 
to "edify" the conversants. What the culture critic must avoid, 
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however, is the temptation to get caught up in conversations, to 
take a position and thereby to commit the post-Philosophical 
equivalent of Original Sin- to claim to have a view on anything: 
... [E]difying philosophers have to decry the very notion 
of a view, While avoiding having a view about having 
views. This is an awkward, but not impossible position.24 
As much as this position of no position superficially resembles 
the mystic's void of emptiness (sl1nyata, fana), it is better described 
as nihilism. 
The various elements of the modern image recur: humanity's 
search for knowledge pictured as groups of conversations with 
no set topics or rules. The major limitation: talk can only be about 
talk since sentences can only refer to other sentences. All 
conversations are worthy to whatever participants they attract, 
with the good pragmatic proviso that they ought somehow help 
the conversants to cope - with what is not so clear. Ali 
conversations take place on the same floor, so to speak. There 
are none higher or lower - what counts is that they be interesting 
enough to keep going. And if not, we will find others more interesting 
as we move on in time. 
Conversations are temporally bound, and the topics change. 
We get into difficulties, says Rorty, when we beli-eve that all 
philosophical conversations are about the same topics - truth, 
beauty, reason, and so on. Not at all, for there are many 
conversations that cannot be represented in the terms of other 
on-going conversations. They are incommensurable. Yet we suggest, 
pace Rorty, that the empty human, the Protean human, searching 
for an identity that does not exist, is the image of commensurability 
among the characteristically modern conversations. 
But this claim cannot be dealt with from within Rorty's 
perspective. The problem with relativism, according to perennialists, 
is that it relativizes its own position; it cannot "prove" itself. But 
that objection is empty unless made from another level. 
Hermeneuticism's fundamental assumption is that we cannot 
bootstrap ourselves out of the hermeneutical circle. What gives 
plausibility to such a position is its underlying anthropology which 
is unidimensional, on the one hand, and indeterminate, on the other. 
In this view, what distinguishes the human is behaviour; behaviour 
changes across time. There is nothing beneath what is apparent, 
the phenomenal. Or at least if there is we can't get to it, for we 
perceive through our interpretive lenses; those lenses, part of our 
behavioural repertoire, change across time. There is no Archimedean 
point; there is no human essence, no transcendental reference that 
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we haven't made up - and this is Becker's point - to cover the 
insecurity of our relativist position. There is no meaning in this 
vast universe that we don't put there. We are embedded in nothing, 
in vacuum. In psychoanalytic terms we are parentless is the cosmos. 
In contrast, perennial philosophy offers a contemporary 
perspective that utterly denies the validity of hermeneuticism's 
relativism without denying the hermeneutical critique of positivism 
and of reductionist scientism. 
Toward a Perennial Anthropology 
The Perennial Anthropos 
The first assertion about humanity made by perennialists 
is that there is a human nature, a human essence - a claim that 
is anathema to modern, post-traditional philosophies. Humanity 
is one in an essential way that has always been known by esoteric 
traditions and variously symbolized according to their specific 
patterns of expression. That there is a common recognition expressed 
through the millennia is by far more significant than the variety 
of its expressions. This is so because perennial philosophy shares 
with contemporary hermeneutics an awareness of the limitations 
of human articulation. So while it makes sense to ask, "What is 
humanity"? and to respond with sentences that begin, "Humanity 
is .•• " - it makes no sense at all to expect an entirely adequate 
response since perennial philosophy understands the limits of 
discursive reasoning which entail limitations on the adequacy of 
description: 
. • • [T]o avoid the alteration of truth by a partial, 
restrictive, or systematized representation, one must 
keep in mind the part played by the inexpressible, which 
cannot be enclosed in any form, and which is, 
metaphysically speaking, the most important thing 
-we can say, the only essential thing.25 
We cannot capture ourselves, as the hermeneuticsts 
appropriately assert, within our own linguistic nets. But the 
questioning itself, which expresses our attraction to transcend 
through understanding, points to what is essentially human. As 
Oscar Ichazo says: "Identity is what makes human beings human •... 
It is a question from the self to the self.26 
Perennial anthropology. includes as essentially human the 
eros described by Plato, the urge or attraction to go beyond, to 
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become what we are not yet, and thus cannot describe. So the 
reduction of human identity to the apparent, to the observable 
- to say that human is what human does - is virtually the root 
sin of modernity: 
Precisely because ... the theomorphic nature and the 
terrestrial crust which covers and hides this spiritual 
core, are parts of human nature, man lives in this world 
and is yet bound to his own nature to transcend it •... 
[F]or man cannot remain man without seeking the Infinite 
and without wanting to transcend •.. the merely human. 
Hence to be satisfied with the merely human is to fall 
into the infra-human state.27 
If the urge to transcend moves us so fundamentally, then the normal 
state of being human is to be less than we could be. 
Oscar Ichazo identifies three instincts without which we 
could not survive. We experience these instincts as "living questions", 
a constant subtle probing for the information crucial to survival. 
For the "conservation instinct" the constant question is "How am 
I"? When that internal question stops, our survival is endangered. 
The second, the relations instinct, takes the form of the internal 
question, "Who am I with"? If we cannot distinguish between those 
who can help us and who might hurt us, our survival is at issue. 
These two instincts we share with other animals. The third instinct, 
adaptation, is unique to humanity. The adaptation question is, "What 
am I doing here"? According to Ichazo this is an instinctive question. 
At so primary a level the questions of identity and purpose arise. 
Encompa_ssing but surpassing an anthropology that analyzes human 
processes in relation to the goals of survival and homeostasis of 
the organism or species and is merely functionalist, the urge to 
transcendence represented by Ichazo as instinctually rooted reveals 
all such functionalisms to be reductionist: 
The real question is, What am I here for? Survival is 
not our main obsession, but rather what we are doing 
with that life we have. Again, the interrogation is not 
only, who am I? but rather, What am I here for? ... 
Since [man] must face himself, there must be a purpose 
for his life. Every true mystical tradition tells us that."2 8 
A Darwinian anthropology which has biological survival as 
its telos is not enough. Not that Darwin was wrong. There are survival 
needs, individual and corporate, which are engaged at the instinctual 
level. Also, for Darwin survival is defined at the species level. 
This encompasses Ichazo's "relations instinct". But we do not live 
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in isolation in "nature", we live in societies, always with others. 
The defining characteristic, the search for identity, is also so 
essential as to be instinctive: "What is he looking for? He is looking 
for what human beings are meant to be".29 The questi on of identity, 
then, is in no sense epiphenomenal. Metaphysics is not a reflex 
of class location, nor sublimated libido, as Marx or Freud would 
have it. Nor is it a necessary screening of the dirty facts of life 
and death, as neo-Freudian Ernest Becker would have it. But rather 
metaphysical questions of identity are an expression of that 
instinctual level that is uniquely human, that urge to transcendence 
which is as elemental as physical and sexual hunger. At all levels 
the urge to unify our experience, e.g., through assigning "meaning" 
which unites part with whole, is an expression of that peculiarly 
human adaptation instinct. 
Humanity as Multi-Leveled 
If transcendence defines the human telos, then the re is implied 
the possibility of transcendent dimensions of being. 30 Says Nasr, 
"One discovers . . . the repeated assertion that man has access 
to multiple levels of existence and consciousness within himself 
and a hierarchy of faculties and even 'substances' •... "31 Human 
nature is hierarchical and that hierarchy is ontological, a hierarchy 
of being identical with a hierarchy of knowing, of consciousness. 
So perennialists indicate both the multi-leveled nature of being, 
of what we experience, as well as the multi-leveled nature of how 
we experience. As multi-leveled beings embedded in a multi-leveled 
cosmos, we are microcosmoi constituted and structured identically 
with the rest of the cosmos. This contrasts with a post-traditional 
and materialist perspective, such as that of Ernest Becker, that 
sees humans as anomalous in the universe, freakishly endowed with 
self-awareness around which we can build only self-delusive myths 
of meaning. 
Perennial anthropology joins contemporary critics of Cartesian 
mind/body dualism, but on the basis of radically different premises. 
Rorty, for instance, rejects such dualism by rejecting "mind" or 
"consciousness" as anything to be described as a distinct ontological 
level, asking us to eliminate the notion of "levels" altogether.32 
Perennial philosophy rejects such dualisms on the very different 
ground that multiple levels of human manifestation 
•.. cannot be reduced to the two entities of body and 
soul or mind and body, reflecting the dualism so prevalent 
in post-Cartesian Western thought. This dualism neglects 
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the essential unity of the human microcosm precisely 
because duality implies opposition .... 33 
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Positivists and hermeneuticists reject such dualism on the grounds 
that it posits one ontological category too many, while perennialists 
argue that mind-body dualism reflects an impoverished cosmology 
and anthropology. 
Mystically based anthropologies typically elaborate more 
than two levels, although their taxonomies differ.34 Common to 
the reality-maps upon which perennial anthropology draws are 
the distinctions of physical, emotional, and mental levels - all 
within the context of the spiritual level. Body, feelings, and mind 
are within our ordinary human experience, but meaningful distinctions 
are possible only from a perspective that transcends and thus orders 
them. 
A Perennial Psychology of Normal Consciousness 
The limitation of most of Western psychological research 
and post-traditional philosophical to "ordinary language" 
and to "ordinary experience" is common no matter what other 
disagreements there may be within and between philosophy and 
psychology. Appeal to and cultivation of "non-ordinary" experiences, 
on the other hand, are common to most traditional worldviews 
and all esotericisms.35 Attempts to limit "true" or "meaningful" 
conceptualization of human experience to the body level, the mind 
level, or the mind-body levels, i.e., to those levels affirmed by 
a scientistically-rooted consensus, generate preoccupations within 
modern philosophy and psychology with "anti-metaphysics". Those 
limitations are implicit in · typically modern cosmological and 
anthropological images. 
In this sense Rorty is accurate. "It is pictures rather than 
propositions, metaphors rather than statements", he "which 
determine most of our philosophical convictions". 6 Given belief 
in our modern pictures which capture only the ordinary, we are 
constrained to try to prove the extraordinary from and on the basis 
of the ordinary. "The ego as such", Schuon comments, "cannot 
logically seek the experience of what lies beyond egoity".37 The 
result is obvious: we dismiss the "extraordinary" from the perspective 
of the reality-criteria of the consensus, and in the process we 
cannibalize from within the ontological differentiations (e.g., 
physical, emotional, mental) which manifest even within our ordinary 
experience. At the end we have great difficulty in articulating 
distinctions between mind, emotions, and body, between brain and 
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mind, between consciousness and behaviour. From this limiting 
perspective it is no wonder that the pragmatists desire to get out 
of the business of talking about such matters. 
Only from a perspective that transcends the physical and 
mental realms does it make sense to talk about them with respect 
to ontology. In other words, we must already have accepted as 
established the reality of trans-normal experience if we are to 
make hierarchical distinctions between, say, the physical and the 
mental. How we establish the reality of transcendent realms is 
an important question with which perennialists deal by referring 
to "traditional wisdom", but also by suggesting that the questioner 
find a "path" which will enable him to experience them. At any 
rate it is clear that belief structures founded on experiences of 
the lower realms have no sufficient basis to deny or affirm the 
validity of claims to experiences of higher realms. Put in terms 
of the interest of post-traditional philosophy, to conceptualize 
about conceptualizing seems at first blush paradoxical - analogous 
to the old conundrum of the eye trying to see itself. Within 
intersubjectivity, we can only talk with each other about talking, 
with no way to achieve a standpoint external to conversation. In 
this view there can be only individual experience of intersubjectively 
conditioned realities. 
A perennial anthropology cannot accept the ultimacy of 
personal and/or interpersonal subjectivity. In Hindu-Buddhist terms 
these levels correspond to maya or samsara. Schuon's argument 
on this point is ontological, akin to Anselm's argument for the 
necessary existence of God: 
It is abundantly evident that man can perfectly well 
escape from subjectivity ••. ; the proof of this lies 
in the fact that we are able to conceive both of the 
subjective as such and of passing beyond it. For a man 
who was totally enclosed in his own subJectivity, that 
subjectivity would not even be conceivable. 8 
The very idea that there is thinking beyond subjectivity could not 
have resulted merely from ordinary subjective or inter-subjective 
experience. It had to have entered human awareness from a higher 
mental level which could be talked of as objective and 
inter-objective. Perennial anthropology, then, locates itself or 
speaks from the level of the transpersonal, a position hierarchically 
superior to the inter-subjective construction of persons.39 
Esoteric psychology and philosophy agree with post-traditional 
psychological and philosophical analyses of the determinative effects 
of physical and emotional states on mental functioning. As well, 
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there is agreement on the determinative symbolic-conceptual shaping 
that results from participating in a consensus. But such phenomena 
can be understood to be developmentally necessary while not 
ultimate. As we shall see, the "devolutionist" version of perennial 
philosophy, as represented by Guenon, Schuon, Nasr, and others, 
insists that paths to transcendence and transformation must be 
situated within traditional contexts. This is so because it is only 
wi thin such comm unities that the socializing structures are 
conditioned by revealed religions. 40 So we see that stereotypes 
of perennial philosophy which suggest that perennialists claim a 
"generic" religion or a "generic" mystical path are ill-founded. 
Revelations which establish religions take a form appropriate to 
and/or seek to establish particular social conditions. Within a 
traditional culture, the pattern of the path of transcendence is 
related to the revealed requirements of the specific esoteric religion 
and its society. 
There is an "evolutionist" version of perennial philosophy, 
too, which draws upon modern Western analyses of "samsaric" states 
to analyze the development of individual body-minds wi t hin societies 
which may or may not be tradi tional. 41 Ichazo and Wilber share 
the view that the development of ego as described by non-traditional 
psychologies is an expression of the primordial myth of the Fall. 
In Ichazo's formulation: 
We have to distinguish between man as he is in essence, 
and as he is in ego or personality. . . . Every human 
being starts in pure essence. Then something happens: 
the ego begins to develop; karma accumulates; there 
is a transition from objectivity to subjectivity; man 
falls from essence into personality •... Ego consciousness 
is the limited mode of awareness that develops as a 
result of the fall into society. Personality forms a 
defensive layer over the essence .... 42 
Both versions of perennial philosophy agree that the 
quintessential human task, the "saving of one's soul", involves the 
transcendence of attachment to the social consensus of normal 
reality. 
Only transcendence opens the way to the full realization 
of human possibilities. Although all perennialists agree that there 
is a variety of such possibilities and that there are and have been 
exemplars of self-realization, the two versions differ on the 
characterization of the possible ways. With respect to modernity 
as a base line from which to climb, the issue is illustrated by the 
story about a rural paragon of Coolidge-like prolixity who, upon 
198 
considering a tourist's plea for directions, replied, "You can't get 
there from here". The "evolutionists" argue that we can and must 
be able to get there from here, while the "devolutionists" declare 
that the road has been eradicated from the non-traditional cultural 
map. However, before we deal with the question of traditional 
and non-traditional "ways", let us briefly characterize just what 
"getting there" means. 
The Upper Levels of the Perennial Anthropos: Soul 
All esoteric teaching traditions agree that there are stages 
beyond discursive reason, beyond mind manifest-as- ego, although 
their descriptions and enumeration of the various levels do differ. 
Huston Smith refers to the "soul" and "spirit" levels, between which 
lies that "equator" that distinguishes individual awareness from 
what lies beyond individuality. The soul level is individual, but 
non-egoic, beyond socially-constructed personality: 
The soul is the final locus of our individuality. Situated 
as it were behind the senses, it sees through the eyes 
without being seen, hears with the ears without itself 
being heard. Similarly it lies deeper than mind. If we 
equate mind with the stream of consciousness, the soul 
is the source of the stream; it is also its witness while 
never itself a!,)pearing within the stream as a datum 
to be observed.ll3 
Ichazo terms this level the "divine-human prototype" or "the 
pattern". It is what is archetypally human, that of which we can 
become aware by transcending ego-attached personality. 
Alternatively he refers to it as the "seedless state" which he claims 
can be attained only by means of clarifying all personal karma 
- eliminating the pressures stemming from the history of our egoism. 
This level represent s the achievement of our full identity, our 
integration as human beings. 44 
This level, the soul level, is the "interface" of the personal 
or individual with the archetypal form of humanity. Self-realization 
requires clarification of consciousness to the point at which there 
is self-recognition in that soul-space; it is a level of being and 
is itself transcendable. 45 
In knowing that level, mind is transparent. Soul attends to 
mind, employs reason, and lies behind mental functioning. In a 
Pali text the Buddha is reported to say: 
Now, if anyone should put the questions, whether 
I admit any view at all, he should be answered thus: 
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The Perfect One is free from any theory, for the Perfect 
One has understood what the body is, and how it arises 
and passes away. He has understood what the mental 
functions are, and how they arise, and pass away. He 
had understood what consciousness is, and how it arises 
and passes away. Therefore, I say, the Perfect One 
has won complete deliverance through the extinction, 
fading away, disappearance, rejection, and getting rid 
of all opinions and conjectures, of all inclination to 
the vainglory of 'I' and 'mine'. 46 
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For this text the penultimate level is understanding the mental 
formations, and the level from which there is such understanding 
is what perennialists call "soul". It is the highest level of "1" available 
to us and even attracts what is below to transcend toward it, although 
normally our self-sense attaches as ego to lower levels instead. 
In the images . of emanation and return in which perennial 
cosmology tends to be expressed, then, soul is the level which 
attracts what is below and is oriented toward what is above: 
From the lowest level of reality, where even matter 
reaches out for form, to the highest heavens where 
angels gravitate around the Throne, a single breath 
and motion sweeps through existence, the search of 
each existent for the Good. 
Our interest here is the way man, specifically his 
soul, instances this tendency. 47 
Each level in the hierarchy of being enfolds and implicates the 
levels below it. Soul mediates spirit to what lies below, connecting 
and turning body and mind to spirit. Myths of the Fall in the various 
traditions are, according to this perennial perspective, expressions 
of the process of devolution from spirit to soul to matter. 
All manifestations, of macrocosm and microcosm, are 
understood as energy/spirit enformed as different levels of "density". 
And since all existents are on a continuum of hierarchically ordered 
levels, no dualism - psychological or cosmological - is final. Thus 
a perennial anthropology acknowledges a hierarchy of levels within 
which the human being moves toward sustained awareness of internal 
unity, unity with all humans (since we are all identically constituted 
by the same laws), and unity with all creation or manifested being. 
But this very recognition of the unity of all creation opens us to 
the question of the origin of being - in what is our soul-level 
embedded? This leads us to consider what is beyond Being. For 
perennial philosophy, what takes us beyond soul to spirit is the 
continuum of Intellect, from which emerges our experiencing as 
soul and mind. 
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The Bridge: Reason and Intellect 
It is through the soul level that we establish connection with 
what transcends, with levels that originate and comprehend individual 
existence. The positing of a level of individual consciousness above 
the "stream of consciousness" is an obvious point of difficulty for 
non-traditional psychologies. For modern philosophy the parallel 
obstacle is the claim that there are noetic levels above mind, and 
that there are criteria beyond reason. The distinction between 
mind and soul is related to that between reason and Intellect as 
utilized by Guenon, Schuon, and Nasr. Intellect, however, points 
us to transpersonal knowledge, beyond soul. Indeed, soul mediates 
Intellect to mind. 48 
A distinguishing feature of perennial anthropology is its heavy 
emphasis on the human as sapiens. Schuon, in a recently translated 
new edition of The Transcendent Unity of Religions, 49 added an 
additional chapter - "To be Man is to Know". Nasr's Gifford Lectures 
were published as Knowledge and the Sacred. The perennial anthropos 
is multi-leveled; those levels are levels of being and of knowing. 
"Knowing" covers a complex set of functions that can be 
hierarchically differentiated. The hierarchy of knowing is dynamic 
and telic, powered by the eros for higher levels. Thus the higher-level 
function is origin, goal, and purpose of the lower. The psychical 
level, for example, is the source and goal of the mental. In relation 
to the function of thinking, Schuon says: 
The sufficient reason for the existence of the human 
creature is the capacity to think; nqt just to think about 
anything, but to think about what matters, and finally, 
what alone matters.50 
This describes the human as creature, as individual. As Guenon 
points out, thinking per se is an individual, formal process. 51 
As we have seen, perennial anthropology is telic, focused 
always on transcendence. The key to transcendence is knowledge, 
or gnosis, so that the perennial anthropology is inevitably gnostic. 
It might seem that Rorty's critique of those Enlightenment ideals 
which make knowing through reason the agent for human perfection 
- with modern consequence that epistemology, or knowing 
about knowing, becomes the new reigning Queen of the sciences 
- should apply also to perennial anthropology. However, perennial 
philosophy is in profound disagreement with virtually all 
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment assumptions about the nature 
of knowing. A crucial difference is that knowledge, for perennial 
philosophy, is not produced by either hypothetico-deductive systems 
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or by induction; knowledge is revealed or recollected. Obviously 
there is knowledge of the material world, and the effectiveness 
of modern science in utilizing knowledge to manipulate matter 
is hardly to be ignored. But mind - which comprehends reason, 
imagination, and memory - functions as a particular, individualized, 
formalized manifestation of Intellect. In the vertical sense of 
causality characteristic of traditional metaphysics, Intellect "causes" 
mind. To attribute mental functioning to any collection or 
organization of physical properties - as is common in contemporary 
neuro-sciences and attendant philosophies is regarded by 
perennialists as a category error which proceeds from an inadequate 
ontology. Moreover, this error has profound consequences for human 
existence: "The rational faculty detached from its supernatural 
context is necessarily opposed to man".52 
Many perennialists fault modernity for inflating and debasing 
reason. We shall see later that there is an important area of 
difference among perennialists in this evaluation of modernity 
in terms of its use of reason. But there is no disagreement that 
reason operating from an assumptive system that acknowledges 
only matter as ultimately real, with subjectivity considered 
epiphenomenal, works at cross purposes to humanity's proper goal. 
This judgement also applies to the typically modern perspective 
that acknowledges only mind (whether or not reduced to behaviour 
or to neural activity) as the locus of interpretation for defining 
our subjectivity, as if it constituted the totality of our possible 
experiencing. This limitation on "thinking" - which perennialists 
consider our distinctively human characteristic - to the world 
as channeled by our senses (and projections) originates in a dangerous 
apotheosis of a limited faculty. This modern orientation, when 
seen from a theological standpoint, is idolatry; from a logical one, 
it is ignorance of the principle of sufficient cause. 
A characteristic of perceiving reality hierarchically is the 
recognition that causal analysis changes from level to level. 
Materialism, by contrast, interprets phenomena within a horizontal 
framework that is fundamentally uni-leveled. It understands reason 
as a product of the neural system or, functionally interpreted, 
as a substitute for the instincts of our non-human ancestors. 
Cause-as-material-cause or cause-as-function become the dominant 
modes within this paradigm. 
But causality in an ontologically hierarchical cosmos is 
understood quite differently. Nasr sums up the perennialist critique 
of reductive understandings of cause: 
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• • • (LJimitations of modern science are to be seen 
... in its neglect of these higher states of being and 
its treatment of the physical world as if it were an 
independent order of reality. This neglect of the 
unmanifested and in fact nonphysical aspects of reality 
has not only impoverished the vision of cosmic reality 
in a world dominated by scientism, but it has caused 
confusion between vertical and horizontal causes and 
brought about incredible caricatures of the cosmic 
reality as a result of relegating to the physical domain 
forces and causes which belong to higher orders of 
exis t ence. 53 
One result of this confusion of horizontal and vertical is the 
assignment of causality to temporal priority, i.e., to the order 
of appearance. Hume's analysis of causality in terms of contiguity 
and succession accurately reflects the modern mind. Thus, as the 
paleo-sciences documented the record of appearance of phenomena 
in the physical world from physical remains, a developmental 
materialism was to be expected: 
One of the consequences of this systematic neglect 
of higher orders of existence has been the denial of 
life as an animating principle of energy which has 
penetrated into the physical realm. Rather, life is seen 
as an accidental consequence of molecular motion 
according to that well-known reductionist point of view 
that does not realize that if life or consciousness "result" 
from certain activities of molecules and their 
combinations, they must either have already been present · 
there in some way or come from elsewhere.54 
For a perennial anthropology, analysis of the reasoning function 
is crucial - as many meditators can attest from hours of silent 
self-observation. But any analysis of reasoning per se that takes 
it to be one behavioural system among others, or any attempt to 
found mind on the neurophysiology of the brain, are immediately 
subject to the criticism that they violate the principle of sufficient 
cause, deriving more from less, e.g., mental functioning from 
electrical impulses. And on the same principle, the cause of reason 
cannot be the body. Nonetheless, reason is an aspect of human 
embodiment and does serve physical survival needs. But reason 
depends upon what is hierarchically superior: 
It has been said that man is a reasoning animal, which 
is true in the sense that reason is the distinctive mark 
Religious Traditions 
of man; but reason could not exist without the 
suprarational intelligence that is the Intellect, which 
it prolongs in the direction of sensorial phenomena.55 
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In the causal language of perennial philosophy, Schuon asserts that 
"but for the absolute primacy of the Spirit, relative subjectivity 
would be neither possible nor conceivable; it would be like an effect 
without a cause". 
On the scale of being, each level enlivens what it contains 
and is enlivened by that which contains it. Soul is the principle 
of mind's existence. Intellect is the principle of mind's knowing. 
Intellect is the spectrum of awareness, of knowing, which has the 
possibility of completeness as human manifestation: 
• • • [T]he subjectivity of the animals is only partial, 
whereas that of man is total; the sense of the Absolute 
coincides with the totality of intelligence.56 
But such absolute knowing is not inevitable. For it occurs at a 
transpersonal level, beyond soul: 
Intelligence is either individual or universal; it is either 
reason or Intellect; if it is individual, it must find its 
inspiration in its universal root to the extent that it 
seeks to go beyond the domain of material facts.57 
Cut off from that spiritual root, we are blocked from those levels 
of knowing that transcend mind, and thus we are prevented from 
self-realization. Noetically, that translates as a limitation on 
our possibilities to know immediately, intuitively: 
The only true knowledge . . . is that which implies 
an identification of the subject with the object, or ... 
an assimilation of the object by the subject. . . . [A]ll 
verifiable and effective knowledge is immediate, and 
•.. a mediate knowledge can be only a purely symbolic 
and representative knowledge. 58 
Perennial epistemology, as we have seen, also recognizes 
the indirection of our ordinary knowing - as theory-laden, 
conditioned, and relative. This is discursive knowledge, processed 
linguistically and mentally - experience with sub-titles. But there 
is immediate, intuitive knowledge, which is what all introspective 
traditions cultivate. By self-observation, they claim, we can break 
the reactive link between experiencing and its associative mental 
concomitants. Much Zen practice, for example, is oriented toward 
such unconditioned, intuitive, experiencing which transcends mental 
habits. 
That quality of knowledge, however, is a function of the level 
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of the knower and the consequent relationship to what is known. 
Intellect ranges from simple knowledge of the physical realm to 
a total absolute knowledge in which the distinction between knower 
and known is dissolved. Thus there can be intuitive knowledge 
of the relative, the formal, as well as the unmanifest and the 
Absolute. Above the manifest and formal, the knowledge is by 
identification or assimilation - you know it by being it. Below 
that "equator" of individuality, then, knowledge may be objective 
or subjective, intuitive or discursive, immediate or mediate. The 
relativity or contingency of the object of knowledge does not prevent 
immediate, intuitive knowing of it. As Intellect is the principle 
of all knowing, as metaphysical knowing is the prerequisite of au 
mediate, symbolic knowing, so too all that is in the universe is, 
in principle, inteUigible.59 Achieving such knowledge of the Absolute 
requires self-transcendence, the self-realization which, for the 
perennial anthropology, is the human telos. 
As soul comprehends and enfolds mind, so spirit enfolds soul. 
It is the spirit level which is the realm identified as Absolute, and 
Intellect at that level is the possibility of assimilating what is beyond 
all individual, enformed experiencing. Nat only can we experience 
trans-conceptually, which we do at the soul level, but we can 
experience transpersonally at the spirit level. At transpersonal 
levels, experiencing, being, and knowing are the same. 
The transpersonal penetrates the personal at the soul level 
as Intellect, and it is in this sense that the perennialists claim that 
humans can "know" God. But at this stage our experience has 
transcended the personal. Were "I" to be expressed, the referent 
would not be a personal, historical, uniquely named individual: 
The whole debate regarding the capacity or incapacity 
of the human mind to know God resolves itself thus: 
our intelligence can know God only 'by God', and therefore 
it is God who knows Himself in us. Reason can participate 
instrumentally and provisionally in this knowledge insofar 
as it remains united to God. It can participate in 
Revelation on the one hand, and Intellection on the 
other, the first relating to God 'above us' and the second 
to God 'within us'.60 
If humanity is understood as pontife:r - the bridge "suspended 
between the Infinite and the finite",61 then intelligence is the 
span, with Intellect anchoring it on the side of the Infinite. The 
act of relating to "God above us" (or "God as Thou") is at the soul 
level, while experiencing "God within", transcending subject-object 
dichotomy, is at the level of spirit. 
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What Schuon designates as infinitude above, Huston Smith 
calls the ultimate stage of human being, the Spirit: 
If soul is the element in man that relates to God, Spirit 
is the element that is identi cal with Him - not with 
his personal mode, for on the celestial plane God and 
the soul remain distinct, but with God's mode that is 
infinite. Spirit is the A tman that is Brahman, the aspect 
of man that is the Buddha-nature, the element in man 
which, exceeding the soul's full panoply, is that 'something 
in the soul that is uncreated and uncreatable' (Eckhart). 
It is the true man in Lin Chi the Ch'an master's assertion 
that 'beyond the mass of reddish flesh is the true man 
who has no title'; and the basis for the most famous 
of Sufi claims: Mansur al-Hallaj's assertion, 'ana'l-Haqq, 
I am the absolute Truth, or the True Reality•.62 
With this level we reach the most disputed and most characteristic 
claim of perennial anthropology, which is that all being is on a 
continuum with God's being and that there is an "uncreated element" 
of humanity. This translates experientially as the possibility of 
a unio mystica. As Smith says, "on this final stratum the 
subject-object dichotomy is t ranscended".63 This also represents 
the final stage which completes the human being as microcosm. 
The Ambivalence of Human Verticality 
In his comparative phenomenology of religion, Mircea Eliade 
often comments on the universal myth of the Fall. Human fallenness 
and brokenness is an essential theme in a perennial anthropology. 
Just as the vertical dimension of humanity, stretching from the 
physical to the spiritual, exceeds that of other creatures, so too 
does the human capacity for distortion. It results when humans 
fail to realize their possibilities in the realms available to them: 
• • • [I]f Intellection and Revelation are 'supernaturally 
natural' to man, their refusal is also a possibility of 
nature •. • ; but since man is integrally intelligent and 
thereby integrally free . . . he alone terrestrial 
creatures is free to go against his own nature. 4 
Essentially and originally, humanity is in perfect continuum 
with the spiritual realm; but historically, enformed in time and 
space, humanity is fallen. Therefore, according to Schuon, there 
is a need for authentic revelation in various modalities which suit 
particular historical needs. And so, too, there is a universal 
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resistance to revelation which, according to Schuon and the 
"devolutionist" version of perennial philosophy, finds its most extreme 
expression in modern man: 
Now he possesses this liberty only in the wake of a 
fall which, precisely, separated him first of all from 
that immanent Revelation which is Intellection, and 
then sets him against prophetic Revelation which, for 
its part compensates for the absence of immanent 
Science; and which, by this compensation, awakens 
It, at least in principle. 65 
This separation is experienced as conditioned subjectivity, 
as consciousness-attached. It occurs as separation from Intellect 
internally and from Revelation externally. In both aspects humans 
are cut off from that knowledge (and so, that being) which constitutes 
their purpose and salvation. The irony of the modern for a 
perennialist is that a culture so obsessed with the discovery and 
utilization of information, so flooded with information beyond 
what it can process, should yet be so far from redemptive gnosis, 
As Nasr points out, this is the characteristic disease of modernity, 
symbolized by our truncated human image. Moreover, this spiritual 
"amputation" is correlated with the origin of modern philosophy 
when philosophy ceased to provide its traditional function of directing 
humanity toward real knowledge: 
Descartes has been rightly called the father of modern 
philosophy for it is he . . . who epitomizes what lies 
at the heart of modern philosophy and even modern 
science, namely the reduction of knowledge to the 
functioning of the individual reason cut off from the 
Intellect •... It was Descartes' individual, and therefore 
from the gnostic point of view 'illusory' self, which 
was placing its experience and consciousness of thinking 
as the foundation of all epistemology and ontology and 
the source of certitude. Even being was subordinated 
to it and considered the consequence of it, hence the 
ergo.66 
From the perspective of the "devolutionist" version of perennial 
philosophy, the Fall is an alienation from the knowledge available 
through Intellect. Within a traditional society founded on a revealed 
religion, that lack is compensated for by revelation. Within a 
non-traditional society cut off by its underlying anthropology and 
cosmology frQm the transpersonal and from truths communicated 
by a tradition, the situation seems hopeless. The modern result 
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is the apotheosis of ego, and a cr1s1s m which human survival, and 
the survival of the planet, is in doubt. 
The impairment suffered by "normal" humanity, as diagnosed 
by perennial philosophy, is an impairment in the capacity for 
immediate knowledge which has a soteriological function. 
"Realization", a perennialist synonym for salvation, is inseparable 
from knowing: 
There is all the difference there between the universal 
unconditioned intellect and human understanding with 
its individual conditions, and also, from another aspect, 
all the difference which separates the standpoint of 
realization from that of a 'theory of knowledge'. The 
very word 'real' • . . takes on an altogether different 
metaphysical value when used to refer to this point 
of view of realization. To be more precise, it becomes 
an expression of the absolute permanence, in the 
Universal, of all that of which the being takes possession 
by the total realization of itself.67 
In the terms of this gnosis the key factor is the lack of connection 
of mind with Intellect. The experience of fallenness is that of a 
subjectivity cut off from anything above. An example of such a 
truncated human image has already been provided from Rorty's 
description of post-Philosophical humanity, and it bears repeating: 
"A post-Philosophical culture, then, would be one in which men 
and women felt themselves alone, merely finite, with no links to 
something Beyond".68 
Rorty captures precisely the ailment of alienation in 
subjectivity diagnosed by perennialists. Rorty offers no cure other 
than eliminating the notion of such a disease. Perennialists insist 
that healing is available. In fact, they claim that remedies have 
always been available - that traditional cultures have been catalyzed 
by and have coalesced around such remedies. Moderns call them 
religions. Traditionally, religions founded on revelations have served 
to bridge the gap between universality and individuality, between 
essence and personality. In perennialist terms, revelation is external 
Intellect, and Intellect is internal revelation. The implications 
which are drawn from this unity in function of Intellect and 
revelation generate the major distinction between those perennialists 
who are "devolutionists" and those who are "evolutionists". This 
division comes on the question whether there are access points 
to the desperately needed gnosis apart from the esotericisms lodged 
within the traditional religions. 
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Perennial Anthropology of Religion: 
Devolution and Evolution 
A major task in elucidating a perennial philosophy and 
anthropology for the modem reader is to highlight the relationship 
between traditional and post-traditional humanity. All perennialists 
agree that even given the great variety in traditional. cultures, 
they share far more with each other than they do with modernity. 
Modern consciousness breaks radically with all prior human 
consciousness. However, a key to differences among perennialists 
is their evaluation of modernity. That evaluation is inseparable 
from their perspectives on the place of traditional religions in 
relation to a secularized culture, and the potential function of 
traditions for the modern seeker. It is here that the distinction 
between "devolutionists" and "evolutionists" begins to become 
clear. 
All perennialists understand the Fall as symbolic of a 
characteristic of individual consciousness. As individuals we are 
caught in maya, apparently as an inevitable result of our being 
incarnate and socialized. Ichazo (an evolutionist) talks about the 
"fall" from essence into personality. Schuon (devolutionist) describes 
"fallen man and thus the average man" as being "poisoned by the 
passional element" which results in "an obscuring of the Intellect 
and the necessity of a Revelation coming from the outside".69 
The major difference between the two expositors of perennial 
philosophy lies in their perspectives on the course of corporate 
human history. Devolutionists seem to preserve the belief in a 
golden age far in the past, one in which humans were not dominated 
by their own "passional elements". At the near end of history is 
modernity, which in their view is so dominated by attachments 
to the passions and to the physical level that its people are virtually 
beyond help. Evolutionists believe that human transformation is 
possible even within the context of modernity. 
Ontology and History: The Devolutionist Position 
Behind the discussion of levels of being and knowing lies an 
image that Lovejoy calls "the great chain of being", and that Guenon 
analyzes in The Multiple States of Being. This hierarchical 
perspective does not interpret the structure of being as a 
developmental process across time. Perennialists reject precisely 
this kind of developmental viewpoint, entailed in Darwinism and 
its kindred theories. Instead, the reality of levels is for them 
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simultaneous or structural rather than temporal. Levels are 
potentials for manifestation, what Ichazo calls "material 
manifestation points". The possibilities for manifestation, Guenon 
and Ichazo would agree, are "eternal" - inherent structures of 
being. Ichazo speaks of the "laws of manifestation", which constitute 
the manifestation points, as "pre-established". Their status for 
perennialists seems to be similar to that of archetypes or Platonic 
ideas. 
The aspects of the totality of creation which find expression 
in space-time, therefore, must be described in terms of descent 
rather than ascent. No being can be caused or causally explained 
from .below: 
•.• [T]he origin of a creature is not a material 
substance, it is a perfect and non-material archetype: 
perfect and conseg_uently having its origin in the Spirit, 
and not in matter. 7U 
Indeed, matter or the physical itself has its origin in what is 
ontologically superior: " .•. [M]atter is the final point of the descent 
of the objective pole, sensorial consciousness being the corresponding 
subjective phenomenon". 71 
The notion of birth as the hierarchically lowest point in a 
process of ontological descent is expressed in Jewish and Christian 
myths about souls in heaven sent down into bodies, as well as in 
analogous stories about reincarnation in Greek and Indic traditions. 
Eliade points to the pervasiveness of myths of a Golden Age as 
characteristic of traditional cultures. 72 In these myths, humanity 
as a whole· maj<es the descent, as evidenced in the widespread theme 
of lost, Edenic societies. The connection between the "perfect 
and non-material archetype" and its earthly manifestation, then, 
is made within the process of human history as well as within the 
manifestation of the individual. This movement of spirit into matter 
is described as 
. . . a trajectory; this starts not from an inert and 
unconscious substance, but proceeds from the Spirit 
- the matrix of all possibilities - to the earthly result, 
the creature; a result which sprang forth from the 
invisible at a cyclic moment when the physical world 
was still far less separate from the psychic world than 
in later and progressively 'hardened' periods. 73 
Just as the individual devolves through the levels, so does all of 
humanity across the vast period of human existence. The result, 
according to the devolutionists, is that as the re-connection with 
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(or re-collection of) the Spiritual ortg:tn becomes more and more 
difficult, an "exterior Revelation" becomes more and more crucial. 
Schuon, in associating the need for Revelation with the 
obscuring of the original Intellect, refers to three stages of 
relationship between Intellect and Revelation: 
There are here three possibilities: firstly, men dominate 
the passional element, everyone lives spiritually by 
his inward Revelation; this is the golden age, in which 
everyone is born an initiate. Second possibility: men 
are affected by the passional element to the point of 
foregetting certain aspects of the truth, whence the 
necessity - or the opportuneness - of Revelations 
that while being outward are metaphysical in spirit, 
such as the Upanishads. Thirdly: the majority of men 
are dominated by passions, whence the formalistic, 
exclusive and com ba t i ve religions ••.. 7 4 
And, the devolutionists add, there is a fourth possibility, which 
is the one most characteristic of modernity. In the modern age 
(which is an instance of kali yuga), even "formalistic, exclusive 
and combative" religions are denied by what Guenon calls "the 
reign of quantity" - and the connection with the Spiritual seems 
entirely lost. 
For the perennialist who is devolutionary in orientation, human 
history as a whole is a recapitulation of the ontological process 
of the descent of Spirit into matter. The current age is judged 
to be at an end-point opposite the Edenic stage. Moderns are born 
into a socially constructed world which makes spiritual realities 
inaccessible to them and makes transcendence incomprehensible 
to them - cutting them off from Revelation and Intellect. 
Nasr distinguishes between "Pontifical" and "Promethean" 
images of man. His way of applying these images is representative 
of the devolutionary orientation which finds the image which is 
typical of modernity to be thoroughly Promethean: 
Promethean man . . . is a creature of this world. He 
feels at home on earth, earth not considered as the 
virgin nature which is itself an echo of paradise, but 
as the artificial world created by Promethean man 
himself in order to make it possible for him to forget 
God and his own inner reality. Such a man envisages 
life as a big marketplace in which he is free to roam 
around and choose objects at will. Having lost the sense 
of the sacred, he is drowned in transience and 
impermanence and becomes a slave of his own lower 
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nature, surrender to which he considers freedom. He 
follows passively the downward flow of the cycle of 
human history in which he takes pride by claiming that 
in doing so he has created his own destiny. 75 
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Under such circumstances the only remedy to which one could 
turn would be the traditional religions as bearers of revelations. 
By apprenticing oneself to the exoteMc forms of one of the authentic 
traditions, eventually it might become possible to enter the esoteMc 
mode preserved within the religion's outer forms. · 
Schuon notes the paradox involved in presenting traditional 
wisdom as a "perennial philosophy" which is available to any reader 
who happens upon it in this predominately Promethean world: 
We live in an age of confusion and thirst in which the 
advantages of communication are greater than those 
of secrecy; moreover, only those esoteric theses can 
satisfy the imperious logi cal needs created by the 
philosophic and sci entifi c positions of the modern world. 76 
Perennial philosophy, especially in this situation, constitutes an 
invitation to secular humanity to reconsider their traditional religious 
roots. 
Yet the invitation is offered with little hope that many will 
respond, or that those who do so will be very discerning in their 
response. The distinctively modern temper is at best non-religious 
and more characteristically anti-religious. Therefore, Schuon 
acknowledges that "it has become increasingly difficult to accept 
. • . not merely that a particular religion is the only true one, 
but also that there is such a thing as a true religion". 77 And we 
must note that where the criteria of truth are imposed by the 
positivists, the only party which will fight for recognition on those 
terms are the fundamentalists; where there are criteria-less 
conversations in the congenial atmosphere of Rorty's hermeneutics, 
there all dogmatic claims will become historicized and relativized 
- and 'truth' will denote whatever seems attractive within the 
intersubjectivity of the participants. 
Against this background of narrowed or lost criteria, 
devolutionists claim that two main functions are served by their 
perennialist perspective. First, perennialism, as a philosophy, can 
effectively oppose modern ideologies. Second, the esoterism at 
its core can provide a critical function to guide whatever efforts 
moderns may make to appropriate traditional exotericisms. From 
a perennialist standpoint, each tradition is limited in the sense 
that revelations and the human responses to them in particular 
historical circumstances tend to generate limitations in terms 
of cosmology, eschatology, and exclusivism: 
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Religious theses are certainly not errors, but they are 
cut to the measure of some mental and moral 
opportuneness; men come in the end to see through 
the adaptation as such, but meantime the truth, for 
them, is lost. 78 
If nothing more, perennial philosophy can provide - even in this 
kali-yuga - a critical standard over and against modern philosophies 
and particular traditions: 
Only esoterism can explain the particular 'cut' or 
adaptation and restore the lost truth by referring to 
the total truth; this alone can provide answers that 
are neither fragmentary nor compromised in advance 
by a denominational bias. Just as rationalism can remove 
faith, so esoterism can restore it. 79 
But this remedy is of limited value since only the rare individual 
is attracted to it. Schuon, for example, addresses his writings "only 
to those who want to read and understand them".80 The process 
of human history as a whole has been one of increasing alienation. 
Cut off from Intellect and Revelation, the profoundly human 
inclination toward redemption tends to get short-circuited by the 
modern assumption that assertions about its possibility are 
"metaphysical" in the sense of "fictional". So the modern person 
is put in a position in which religion no longer can perform its 
"higher" function of providing access to an esoteric core, and 
humanity is left to pursue its self-devised and ultimately destructive 
Promethean schemes. The Fall becomes the most apt image of 
the corporate and the individual career, while the notion of the 
Return or Ascent remains as little more than a dim memory or 
depends on the enterprise of the extraordinary individual. Any 
movement which has its roots in modernity must be disqualified 
by the devolutionists from having redemptive value. 
The Evolutionist Critique 
But on what does this disqualification rest? Not on an 
ontological judgment which perceives each human existence as 
the result of a devolving process, but on an historical judgment 
committed to a theory of the descent of human civilizations. It 
is this judgment that Ken Wilber calls into question. And indeed 
the credibility of perennial philosophy as such may be called into 
question - admittedly "from below" - if commitment to a 
devolutionist history is required. 
Wilber distinguishes between a "theological fall" - what 
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we have described as "ontological" - and a "scientific fall". The 
theological fall is human existence in maya, in ignorance of its 
full potential, its origin. The scientific evidence, according to Wilber, 
is that this is and thus far has always been the normal state of 
embodied, socialized human awareness. The scientific fall, however, 
introduces into consciousness the awareness that this is the case 
- and so requires humans to take into account that separation. 
Wilber interprets the human process, from primitive to modern, 
as an evolution of awareness which has been painful: 
And around the second millennium B.C., after some 
dozen billions of years of struggles and substitutes, 
evolution produced the first fully self-conscious beings, 
who, for just that reason, awoke to their vulnerability, 
separation, alienation, and mortality. They did not create 
all that; they just become aware of all that. That was 
the scientific fa ll .•. the final emergence from Eden .81 
Wilber argues that there simply is no evidence for an historical 
"golden age", but that the stories about it reflect an ontological 
rather than an historical truth. To conflate the theological with 
an historical claim, however, results in a confused position which 
does not seem tenable in light of the data of history. In consequence 
of this confusion, the ontological and anthropological truth in Edenic 
myth is lost -to some extent by those who affirm its historicity 
and entirely by those who deny it. But in both responses the essential 
truth is displaced and subjected to misunderstanding. And it is 
here that Wilber makes a point which Ichazo, too, emphasizes: 
perennial philosophy is not inherently in contradiction with modern 
science: 
• • . [I]f we back up prior to history and time - prior 
to the Big Bang, so to speak - the theologians are right: 
mankind [and all things] did fall from real Heaven [with 
original sin] • • . which is re-created now, moment 
to moment, as a psychological state of ignorance -
what the Hindus and Buddhists call avidya. . • • At 
the same time, the scientists are also right - man came 
up [but not from] the apes. Those are perfectly compatible 
views, and both are correct.82 
So we are brought precisely to the question whether or not the 
conditions for a path (or paths) to transcendence can be met within 
a cultural setting whose major mental features are ruled by a 
scientistic materialism and whose currently prevailing critic is 
a hermeneutical relativism. Can there be authentic mysticism 
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apart from the historically established traditions? Must perennial. 
philosophy be explicitly "traditional" in that sense? Can one find 
access to an effective path apart from already established 
exoterisms? And, if not, is perennial philosophy truly "perennial"? 
Toward a Perennial Hermeneutic 
Perennialists, whether devolutionist or evolutionist, agree 
that there is no necessary contradiction between reason and 
revelation. On the contrary, for Schuon, Nasr et al., Revelation 
and Intellect are functionally equivalent. But a narrowed yet 
technically competent reason, when cut off from the upper 
hierarchical levels, produces a scientism which all perennialists 
- and some moderns - reject. A perennial philosophy, however, 
must proceed from reason in connection with Intellect - i.e., it 
must be "caused" transcendentally in order for its purpose to be 
consonant with the higher purpose of all human existence and in 
order for it to live up to its name. 
Perennial philosophy provides a resource for critical judgment, 
and perennial aqthropology provides a model for human development. 
They have the potential to make a distinctive contribution to issues 
relating to establishment of criteria in contemporary hermeneutical 
discussion. In relation to religion, they offer standards for a perennial 
critique of traditions. Perennialists stand together on these matters. 
Schuon, for example, takes it as axiomatic "that integral spirituality 
comprises by definition a doctrine and a method ...•. n83 
Both Ichazo and Wilber have taken steps toward the formulation 
of principles for a "perennial hermeneutics". Ichazo takes this as 
his main task in Between Metaphysics and Protoanalysis, and Wilber 
does the same in his A Sociable God: A Brief Introduction to a 
Transcendental Sociology. 84 Throughout nearly all of his published 
work, Wilber has been formulating, refining, and elaborating his 
characterization of the hierarchy of levels of consciousness, in 
which he seeks to harmonize traditional and modern models of 
being and awareness. And, on the basis of this "map" of consciousness, 
he evaluates specific and typical socio-religious phenomena. Ichazo, 
too, works with a hierarchical map of consciousness, as yet 
unpublished; but he gives most of his attention to the task of 
analyzing alternative types of logic, which he sets out on an 
onto-historical scale. He and Wilber alike propose that if we take 
as our measure the levels of consciousness known and available 
within a given cultural nexus, then humanity should be regarded 
as having evolved across time toward Return, or Ascent, by 
"involution". 
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Ichazo regards the emergence of a new logic as a crucial 
step in the redemption of humanity in general, and he considers 
it the key to the more specific methodological task of formulating 
a "scientific mysticism". Like other perennialists, he begins with 
the assumption that perennial philosophy has at its centre a 
hierarchical and sapiential orientation, and that one's level of 
knowing must match one's level of being: 
We believe that there are ideas a person must understand 
in order to be whole. Not only must we change the way 
we think but we must change what we think.85 
He proposes that with an adequate logic the territory of the mind 
can be mapped and that he has done so with "scientific" accuracy. 
He claims to understand the various levels and typical modes of 
human manifestation, and to be able to pass them to others by 
means of a comprehensive set of individual and group exercises 
which presuppose and apply the complete map of consciousness 
which opens the way to realization: 
• [W]e want to achieve that state of totality not 
by denying the intellect but by using the intellect as 
an instrument to achieve that situation. . . . That 
means, again, that we must know all the parameters 
of the mind, how it works, and how to use it to our 
benefit rather than in our disturbance.86 
Ichazo affirms that the map and the logic which he proposes, and 
by means of which the theory and practice of a "scientific mysticism" 
is elaborated, can be utilized to disclose the principles of all 
manifestation. He terms the logic which is appropriate to this 
task "trialectics", and its proper use is for 
. . • the discovery of unity by way of . • . logical 
reasoning .... Why is this so important? Because proving 
the unity of God with trialectical logic means that 
it is possible to understand all that is inside the 
universe.87 
The assumption that defines Ichazo's approach as evolutionist 
is that his method will allow one to "climb the ladder of Intellect" 
without adherence by belief or practice to a traditional religion. 
Revelation, established in and through one of the authentic traditions, 
is not a precondition to realization. Rather, he characterizes the 
modes of thought which he claims are associated with the dogmatic 
components of traditional religions as pre-logical. And he regards 
trialectics, as a type of logic, to be the only one which is wholly 
adequate to the fulfilment of human mental functioning in the 
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service of unitive mysticism. By contrast, dependence on dogma 
is pre-logical, systematic articulation of theology tends to utilize 
a pattern of formal logic such as that of Aristotle, and the effort 
to make logic applicable under the conditions of time and change 
has resulted in formulations such as the dialectics of Hegel. Only 
trialectics, according to Ichazo, is effective in the service of 
comprehending the laws of manifestation of knowing and of being. 
However, Ichazo is not simply proposing that proper reasoning 
is equivalent to enlightenment. His point is that 
It is natural in the history of humanity that every time 
and every epoch has to have its own ways of realization. 
Now, that is what our technological society needs to 
work on more. [Our theory] is trying in that sense to 
fit with our time and with the natural process of evolution 
of human history, to match the problems that evolving 
society presents.88 
He is proposing an alternative to the position represented by Schuon 
that participation in an exoteric form of traditional is 
the prerequisite to entering an effective path toward realization. 
The standard of evaluation for a path, according to any 
formulation of perennial philosophy, is its effectiveness in enabling 
transformation. If one form or another has ceased to attract due 
to changes in the conditions of human existence, then why not 
suppose that another is emerging now to serve its function - and 
yet another may emerge in the future? After all, a variety of 
effective forms did appear in the past to match specific human 
conditions. As perennial philosophy claims, the Buddha gave 
expression to revelation in a manner suited to one place and time, 
Moses to another, Jesus another again - each manifesting within 
particular space-time conditions. And from this, Wilber's point 
is that there is a perennial anthropology which makes it possible 
to develop a scale of evaluation, and that all religious phenomena 
are open to critical assessment by it. Primordiality or antiquity, 
simply as such, are no guarantee of authenticity and effectiveness. 
Nor does recent emergence automatically disqualify the claims 
for a path. If temporal location is taken as a decisive consideration, 
perennial philosophy's adherence to eternal values is undercut. 
Ichazo and Wilber share a common perspective on the current 
place of religion and reason in relation to the goal of self-realization. 
Ichazo asserts the redemptive value of Intellect, apart from prior 
revelations. He regards the latter to be valid and authentic, but 
timebound in expression. He acknowledges that even in this age 
revelation is possible, but he claims that it does not depend upon 
faith for its effectiveness: 
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We have the three things that really make a reality. 
We have a school, we have a true teaching, scientifically 
speaking, and we have a true message that only comes 
by way of divine revelation.89 
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Ichazo's positive emphasis is on the effectiveness of reason and 
revelation for realization, and his critique is of the current 
ineffectiveness of faith which lacks the support of an adequate 
logical mode.90 Hence - as moderns and most perennialists agree 
- the conditions required for religious exotericisms to function 
tend to be lacking in modernizing cultures. 
Wilber, too, concludes that the exoteric forms have lost their 
utility in a world in which the capacity for belief in dogma has 
been exhausted. He shares the thesis that ordinary, socialized human 
consciousness has evolved over milennia and continues to evolve; 
and he seeks to illustrate, if not demonstrate, it in Up from Eden. 
His schema of the evolution of human consciousness, like Ichazo's, 
moves from mythic-religion, to metaphysics (still captured within 
a mythic-religious f ramew ork), to rational science (in rebellion 
against metaphysics because of its mythic-religious context) , to 
a metaphysics released from belief in myth - or from what Ichazo 
terms "pre-logical thinking". 
Both of them agree that individuals achieved transcendence 
within prior mythic or pre-logical cultures, and both affirm that 
the general level of human awareness is manifesting on an ascending 
scale across time. Wilber outlines this as a two-tiered developmental 
schema. As humanity evolves its basal level of consciousness in 
the exoteric tier (say, from magical to mythical to rational), 
increasingly higher modes of consciousness become available in 
the corresponding esoteric tier: 
..• [T]he new egoic structures, as a true evolution 
of consciousness, brought new and expanded potentials. 
It brought a new level of exchange, that of mutual 
self-recognition and esteem. It brought a higher 
mentality; the possibility of rational comprehension; 
self-reflexiveness; a grasp of historical time; a final 
transcendence of nature and the body; a new form of, 
and potential respect for, morality; legally recognized 
self-consciousness; and the beginning of the sanctity 
of personhood. These might not have been universally 
implemented and respected, but the potential for such 
exchanges was clearly present. 91 
Make no mistake - this is a pattern of progress, as measured from 
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a perennial perspective. These potentials become available as their 
lawful preconditions are met. 
But (recall the "ambivalence of verticality" section above) 
Wilber notes that each step in development in the basal level of 
consciousness opens humanity to the possibility of increased 
suffering, too: 
The new egoic structure also brought necessarily, new 
terrors. The self-conscious ego was more vulnerable, 
more aware of its mortality; more guilty in its emergence; 
more open to anxiety. And the new terrors inherent 
in the ego, when coupled with the new powers of the 
ego, resulted in the possibility (not necessity) of even 
more brutal terrors exercised by the ego: new substitute 
sacrifices, mass homicides, oppressive exploitation, 
massive slavery, class alienation, violent inequality, 
hedonistic overindulgence, and wildly exaggerated 
substitute gratifications •... 92 
The evolutionist Wilber could match any of the devolutionists in 
characterizing the negative features of modernity, but he reads 
them as the price of significant advance rather than as evidence 
of radical decline. 
Wilber's treatment of the ambivalence of growth and 
development is indebted to the work of Ernest Becker. In the last 
three books which he wrote near the end of his life, and which 
are contributions to a psychoanalytic critique of culture, Becker 
relentlessly places his emphasis on the ways in which human beings 
symbolize and project fears. They are revealed in our attachments 
- to each other, to our society, to our social roles, and to our 
possessions - and in how we use these attachments to focus and 
deflect the desire for what we simply cannot obtain - release 
from the fear of being alone in a universe of matter and space, 
a world where death wipes out all achievements. He also highlights 
the terror involved in becoming aware (e.g., via de-mythologizing 
teachers, psychologists, philosophers) of these games of avoidance. 
Wilber adapts Becker's general conclusion to his own purposes. 
By leaving innocence and ignorance, we may certainly move closer 
to realization; but we are also opened to a sense of vulnerability 
that is analogous to what we might experience in leaving the security 
of parental protection (or of any dependency relationship). Along 
with greater power comes greater insecurity, greater responsibility 
and more terrifying potential consequences. But, for Wilber and 
other perennialists of an evolutionist orientation, what Becker 
took to be the final truth about the tragic human condition is taken 
to be the truth about a transitional stage in human development. 
Religious Traditions 219 
Both Wilber and Ichazo acknowledge the imlTiense, perhaps 
insurmountable, dangers, generated by the . modern 
of reason, dissociated from the spm realm. 'They 
also Vtew the growth of materialism - paradoxically - as a 
metaphysical principle. As evolutionary perennialists who are working 
from an anthropology that acknowledges a full range of levels, 
they can survey and critically evaluate the human image 
as a case of stunted development which results m an anthropology 
which cannot rise above the mental level. But they also acknowledge 
remarkable modern developments at the mental including 
powerful of mapping that realm and tt. . 
. . !hat ts to say that a perennial position, ortented, 
tt truly critical and objective, cannot but tts 
tmparttally. When it does so it accords no spectal standmg to 
either the nostalgic yearning' for Eden (which Eliade associates 
with the archaic-mythical mind-set) or the anxious pursuit of novelty 
(which Becker associates with the modem flight from death). 
The Uses of a Perennial Hermeneutic 
We need to realize the possibility of a perennial hermeneutic 
that can truly engage the situation in which we find ourselves. 
Perennial philosophy has something to learn from contemporary 
hermeneutics in that regard. Joseph Bleicher, in a clarifying account 
of the state of the current hermeneutical arts, sounds a warning 
that perennialists must take to heart. He says that "the object 
of hermeneutics (i.e., interpretation) can be rejected in toto only 
at a price; the blindness towards the moment of transcendence 
inherent in cultural manifestations".93 Hermeneutics has opened 
us to the variety of conversations in which humanity participates, 
to the variety of traditions. The struggle within contemporary 
hermeneutics has to do with what Rorty calls "the 
incommensurability" of the conversations, the absence of a neutral 
perspective from which to evaluate the claims and descriptions 
of the conversants. The mental conditioning inherent in the use 
of language in all conversations immediately precludes absolute 
claims to any uniquely true expressions. 
Although a perennial perspective transcends the finality of 
the traps of socialized minds, there is still much to learn at the 
level of cultural particularity and plurality. Part of the current 
crisis in religion at participant and student levels has to do with 
the immediate availability of the variety of traditions. The 
appropriate criticism of exoteric-orthodox historical and 
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epistemological claims by positivistically-inclined critics has been 
replaced by hermeneutical approaches seeking to escape a nihilistic 
relativism so easily generated by the bare fact of the plurality 
of traditions. The absence of a critical principle (not external to 
but superior to the traditions themselves, as well as to the critical 
contemporary "traditions" confronting them) has led to an impasse 
in understanding. Perennial philosophy can offer the needed 
appreciation of both the ontological Absolute underlying and, indeed, 
causing those various traditions and modernisms devoted to the 
ideal of transcendence, and a necessary tentativeness about the 
finality of any particular expression of that Absolute. 
A perennial hermeneutic offers the possibility, then, of a 
standard of commensurability within the realm of Being, while 
recognizing its limitations within the hierarchically superior realm 
of Non-being, or Plenum. It is in this spirit that we look toward 
further explorations of Wilber's hermeneutics (now sketchily set 
out in A Sociable God) as well as of Ichazo's hierarchy of logics 
(presented in a cryptic way in Between Metaphysics and 
Protoanalysis). Both of these programs suggest that the current 
state of modern thinking need not occasion total despair. Modern 
gains in our understanding of our physical existence are undeniable. 
Moreover, modern techniques for the analysis of intra-psychic 
processes seem to be fast approaching the sophistication of, say, 
traditional Buddhist psychology. All traditions have had to deal 
in one way or another with the analysis of subjectivity. A scientific 
approach to subjectivity, which is a major strength of Western 
psychological research, is the beginning of an appropriate path 
for humans who have been socialized in scientifically-oriented 
cultures. A metaphysics based on the laws of manifestation in all 
realms is the only kind which can be adeqauate to the current 
conditions - and crises - of modern existence. 
Owen Barfield, a long-time interpreter of the thought of 
Rudolf Steiner, in a recent review of a new edition of Steiner's 
major works makes the following observation: 
That stage in the evolution of consciousness which gave 
rise to, and has been urged forward by, the scientific 
revolution in the West is, on the one hand, responsible 
for the prevailing materialism of the present age. On 
the other hand it is that which has made possible exact 
knowledge both of nature and of spirit. Up to now this 
has only been realized in relation to the knowledge 
of nature, and there only in a very limited (predominantly 
mineral) sphere. Correlatively, however, it has made 
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possible exact knowledge of man's own spirit and of 
the spiritual world of which he is a part.94 
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It is this sort of inquiry that Ichazo calls "scientific mysticism". 
The recognition of the lawfulness of physical manifestation has 
been followed by the articulation of the laws themselves, a process 
manifesting right now. And the same is occurring with the recognition 
of the lawfulness of manifestation of emotional and mental processes. 
Scientific mysticism, then, is by no means a paradox. Rather, it 
is the current awareness of the creation by Logos. All manifestation 
is lawful. That is the burden of the rabbinic midrash on the first 
chapter of Genesis which declares that God, in creating the universe, 
looked into the Torah for directions. 
In the acceptance of science as a tool for human 
transformation, we must also acknowledge the key to its utility: 
the reconciliation of the reason of science with Intellect. But we 
must also inquire with openness into current claims to manifestation 
of Intellect, even Revelation, which are apart from already manifest 
exoterisms. For this we need, we repeat, a perennial hermeneutic. 
If we accept the distinction of esoterism from exoterism, we must 
look to apparently secular forms of human existence for current 
exoterism. We cannot aff0rd to prejudge the situation by dismissing 
out of hand current yearnings and techniques for transcendence. 
Nor can we forget that humanity is in a crisis which may be final. 
In truth we see this, and in our seeing we begin to be realigned 
with the sacrality of Mother Earth. As we slip into the terror of 
self-destruction, we see that we are joined together in ways unknown 
until this moment. Perennialism and hermeneutics build on this 
awareness of the dependence of individual consciousness on the 
larger community of consciousness. This is integral to their shared 
critique of the major modern sin - the obsession with ego, the 
apotheosis of the individual. Yet the awareness of our unity in 
a wider circle of humanity is simultaneously an awarenes of the 
variety of religious traditions, which makes it impossible for us 
to validate any orthodox claim to exclusive possession of total 
truth. 
While a perennial hermeneutic must beware of nostalgia for 
traditions which are no longer accessible to a rapidly changing 
humanity, it must also heed the basic lesson from historical analysis 
that traditions continue to change the forms of expression of their 
esoteric core. Granted that every authentic cumulative tradition 
proceeds from an eternal archetype - which causes its space-time 
realization - the possibilities for realization of the archetype 
shift across the ages which we reckon in our historicizing. And 
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in every age a perennial hermeneutic will be open in principle toward 
mutual enrichment of the several traditions by one another, and 
toward non-exclusivist formulations within each of them. In 
modernity the need for such openness is particularly acute, and 
the main alterna tives to it are unreasoning skepticism and 
unreasoning fundam entalism.95 
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